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VOLUME 62 NO. 1, 2020
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DOCTRINE OF
PLENARY STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER
NINA NEFF*
ABSTRACT
Unlike the federal legislature, state legislatures possess plenary
power, except insofar as they are limited by state constitutions.
Though state plenary power is rooted in the legal authority of
popular sovereignty, the doctrine of plenary state legislative power
dulls democratic power by eliminating a potential right to local self-
governance and by inducing courts to underenforce constitutional
limits on state legislatures. These trends do not square with our
democratic intuitions or with our desire to have a sense of efficacy,
energy, and power in our own ability to influence the laws of our
communities. This Article suggests that the doctrine of state legisla-
tive plenary power as it is reflected in contemporary case law is
inconsistent with historical conceptions of popular sovereignty that
dominated intellectual life at our country’s founding. It urges courts,
scholars, and the public to give renewed attention to the intellectual
* Nina Marie Neff is a judicial clerk for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Nina would like
to thank Professor Miriam Seifter for her incisive comments on early drafts of this article. She
would also like to thank her mother, Joanie Eppinga, for her always flawless edits. 
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underpinnings of popular sovereignty and imagines what it might
look like for a state’s citizens to actively and independently decide
which powers they cede to their state legislatures—and which they
retain for themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike the U.S. Congress, which is a legislature of limited,
enumerated powers, state legislatures are presumed in constitu-
tional law to have broad plenary power, except insofar as they are
limited (explicitly or impliedly) by the state and federal constitu-
tions.1 Vermont Supreme Court Chief Justice Isaac Fletcher
Redfield wrote in 1854 that state legislatures “have the same
unlimited power in regard to legislation which resides in the British
parliament, except where they are restrained by written constitu-
tions.”2 He argued that legislative power was committed “in the
most general and unlimited manner to the several state legisla-
tures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the constitu-
tion of the United States, or of the particular state in question.”3
Part I of this Article argues that the doctrine of general and
unlimited state power results in anti-democratic trends within state
and local government law doctrine, namely underdevelopment of a
communal right to self-government and underenforcement of state
constitutional limits on legislative power. Part II examines histori-
cal conceptions of popular sovereignty that dominated intellectual
life at our country’s founding and concludes that the doctrine of
state legislative plenary power as it is reflected in contemporary
case law is inconsistent with the premise that all legitimate
sovereign authority resides with the people. The Article concludes
by urging scholars, courts, and the public to intentionally reassert
the democratic public’s rightful control over state and local govern-
ment law.
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE DOCTRINE OF PLENARY POWER FOR STATE
LEGISLATURES
The doctrine of plenary legislative power deeply affects our con-
ception both of what counts as a legitimate constitutional right and
1. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 54-55 (8th ed. 2016).
2. Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 142 (1854).
3. Id. at 143.
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of who counts as a legitimate interpreter of those rights. This Part
argues that the doctrine has served to (1) discount any potential
federal constitutional right to local self-governance, despite its deep
importance to our democratic institutions, and (2) elevate legisla-
tures over courts as the proper interpreter of state constitutional
rights.
A. Underdevelopment of a Right to Local Self-Rule
Multiple, often overlapping local governments significantly
impact our lives in matters of education, policing, incarceration,
emergency medical services, public safety, utility provision, local
infrastructure maintenance, taxes, housing, sanitation, healthcare,
permitting, and other aspects of daily living.4 The Supreme Court
has recognized that these institutions structure the everyday affairs
of most Americans and that their “responsible and responsive
operation” is “of increasing importance to the quality of life of more
and more of our citizens.”5
Yet Americans enjoy few protections of their capacity for local
self-government. The plenary power of state legislatures includes
power over local governments. “Plenary power in the legislature for
all purposes of civil government is the rule” of state government,6
and municipal governments are mere “creatures of the [l]egisla-
ture.”7 Professor Gerald Frug has argued that the United States as
a country has chosen to have “powerless cities” and that it has made
“this choice ... largely ... through legal doctrine.”8
The earliest and most decisive version of this doctrine was
Dillon’s Rule, under which municipal governments could legally
exercise only powers that were (1) expressly granted by the state
legislature, (2) fairly or necessarily implied from expressly granted
4. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 475-76, 481-82 (1968) (applying the one-person,
one-vote argument to local governments despite Texas’s argument that local governments, as
mere administrative arms of the state, did not present any equal protection difficulties in
voting matters).
6. Gangemi v. Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1957) (quoting People ex rel. Wood v. Draper,
15 N.Y. 532, 543 (1857)).
7. Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, 150 S.E. 624, 627 (N.C. 1929).
8. Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (1980).
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powers, or (3) essential and indispensable.9 The rule included a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny requiring that “any fair doubt as
to the existence of power [be] resolved by the courts ... against the
existence of the power.”10 Though Dillon’s Rule has generally fallen
into disfavor, local governments in many jurisdictions still cannot
make laws except pursuant to explicit grants of power from the
state legislature.11
Indeed, local governments do not have a right to exist,12 to assert
rights on behalf of their residents,13 or to consent or object to
annexation.14 Rather, states have the power to create local govern-
ments (or not) and the power to delegate authority to them (or
not).15 Local communities may be regulated by jurisdictions in which
their residents cannot vote16 and may be outvoted on local matters
by voters who do not live in the community.17 Municipalities are
9. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 327 (quoting JOHN FORREST DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 89 (4th ed. 1890)).
10. Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868). For an example of the strict
judicial construction at play in Dillon’s Rule cases, see Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Rev.,
174 A.2d 117, 117, 119 (R.I. 1961) (finding the locality did not have power to establish
regulations requiring landlords to provide hot water when the State had empowered the
locality to adopt laws “for the establishment and enforcement[ ] of minimum standards for
dwellings” but had not specifically authorized regulation of hot water).
11. See generally DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK (2001).
12. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (holding that citizens of the
States “have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of” their
local government corporations).
13. See generally Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 59, 62, 68-71 (2014) (discussing federal case law denying municipalities standing to
sue parens patriae on behalf of residents on the theory that political subdivisions have no
sovereignty except that derived from the State).
14. Jordan v. Town of Morningside, 30 Fed. App’x 144, 147 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
“the state is vested with the exclusive power to make annexation decisions”).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (“A municipal corporation,
created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities
under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.”).
16. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 61, 75 (1978) (holding that Alabama
was constitutionally permitted to empower the city to exercise police power over an area
within three miles of jurisdiction boundaries). For a general review of the constitutional issues
attending extraterritorial regulation, see David E. Hunt, Comment, The Constitutionality of
the Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 157-71 (1977).
17. May v. Town of Mountain Village, 132 F.3d 576, 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding
town charter’s extension of voting rights to nonresident property holders even when
nonresidents could outvote residents).
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severely limited in their control of incorporation, annexation, and
jurisdictional boundaries. As mere creatures of the state, munici-
palities may be created, altered, and dismantled at the state’s
convenience.18 Even constitutional and statutory provisions that
supposedly confer significant autonomy upon cities may, through
the combination of powers granted and withheld, actually substan-
tively limit the actions available to local governments.19
It is not only state courts that have been hostile to local govern-
ment autonomy. Federal courts have not recognized any collective
right of Americans to local self-governance.20 Instead, they have
limited the states’ powers to create, structure, control, and disman-
tle local government only when such actions violate individual
constitutional rights.21 Federal courts have proven to be the most
significant constitutional limit on state control of localities. For
example, the Supreme Court has struck down state statutes that
prohibit localities from undertaking school bussing desegregation
initiatives22 and enacting antidiscrimination ordinances.23 This line
of cases gestures obliquely to the virtues of local government,24 but
its holdings are based in individual liberties, not in a collective right
to local self-government.25 In fact, the federal courts have rejected
multiple constitutional theories of a right to local self-governance,
18. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
19. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003)
(arguing that meaningful local autonomy is a “phantom”); see also GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID
J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 61 (2008) (“All states ... have
one thing in common: nowhere does home rule give cities local autonomy.”).
20. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
21. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 347-48 (1960) (holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment bars states from altering local government boundaries to disenfranchise black
voters).
22. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483-84, 486-87 (1982) (holding
that a state ban on local school bussing initiatives was invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause).
23. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27, 635-36 (1996) (holding that a state ban on local
anti-LGBT discrimination ordinances was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).
24. Writing for the majority in Romer, Justice Kennedy invalidated a statewide
amendment that prohibited local governments from legislating antidiscrimination protections
for LGBT persons “no matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public and
widespread the injury.” Id. at 623, 631.
25. But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local
Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 257 (1999) (arguing that Romer “cannot be reconciled
with the traditional view that state governments have plenary authority” to structure and
empower-or disempower-their political subdivisions).
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including those grounded in the Contracts Clause,26 the Due Process
Clause,27 and the Equal Protection Clause.28
Modern scholars have challenged this doctrine by arguing that a
right to collective, local self-governance may be found in other
constitutional provisions. For example, Professor Nikolas Bowie has
argued that the First Amendment right of freedom of association
was meant to reserve for the people the right to operate local
governmental bodies, or assemblies.29 Jake Sullivan, drawing on
historical records of ratification to argue for a Tenth Amendment
right to local self-government, posits that “the Constitution may
well carve out a limited space for the people to express themselves
and exercise certain powers through local self-government—without
interference by the state.”30 David Barron has argued that cities
have an important, independent interest in enforcing constitutional
norms and that their importance to our constitutional order,
although not explicitly acknowledged in the federal Constitution, is
supported by an “organic conception of constitutional meaning.”31
However, these projects remain largely speculative. The black
letter constitutional law continues to protect local governments from
state action only insofar as individual liberties are implicated.32
Though the modern substantive due process doctrine has provided
Americans with rights deemed so fundamental that the people could
26. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 184, 188 (1923) (declining to apply
Trenton’s Contract Clause theory of restraint against New Jersey in which Trenton was
successor to a private contract permitting tax-free water withdrawals and state-imposed taxes
on the city); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (holding that citizens of
the States “have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of”
their local government corporations); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196
U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905) (holding that state legislatures may interfere in a contract between
a local government and a private party). 
27. See City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 188 (1923) (rejecting due process claims under the
same reasoning that controlled the Court’s Contracts Clause analysis).
28. See Williams v. Baltimore, 298 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (rejecting the city’s equal protection
challenge).
29. Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Local Self-Government, 130 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6-7).
30. Jake Sullivan, Comment, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J.
1935, 1936-39 (2003).
31. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 518, 612 (1999).
32. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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not have given them over to their state legislatures, these rights are
still individual, not collective.33
Instead, local communities are, in themselves, constitutional non-
entities; they are “invisible” to constitutional law, and their
immense impact on our everyday lives emerges in the “gaps between
the rules.”34 The state’s broad power remains at odds with Ameri-
cans’ lived experience of local governments as vital to daily life and
with a number of widely shared democratic intuitions about the
consent of the governed, participatory democracy, and federalism.
First, the principle of consent of the governed is enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence.35 This Enlightenment-era concept,
which appears in the works of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes as
well as in the writings of American revolutionaries such as Thomas
Paine, posits that a government’s legitimacy is derived from the
consent of the people who are governed.36 Akhil Amar has persua-
sively argued that consent of the governed is so foundational to the
legitimacy of American government that it gives Americans the
right to change the Constitution through a “majoritarian and
populist mechanism” that would not require the participation of
state or federal legislatures.37
33. However, rather than relying on substantive due process, Michael Lawrence has made
a creative argument for the right of localities themselves to invoke procedural due process
claims against their states. See Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have
Constitutional Rights?: Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims
Against the State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2002) 
34. “[T]he city (and the wider metropolitan area) is mostly invisible to the doctrine. It
emerges in the gaps between the rules.” RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 131 (2016).
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.”).
36. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651); THOMAS
PAINE, COMMON SENSE (Edward Larkin ed., Broadview Press 2004) (1776).
37. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos has also shown
that federal courts view consent of the governed—and its companion, electoral
accountability—to be a “rhetorical trump card,” even as he argues “that [electoral]
accountability has no (or almost no) business being used this way.” Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 989, 1009-
21, 1067 (2018) (quoting Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 232 (2014)).
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Consent of the governed, far from a mere abstraction, is a concept
that undergirds most Americans’ day-to-day sense of government’s
role. Schoolchildren learn about this premise of our government
when they are taught that there should be “no taxation without
representation,”38 and legal scholars draw on it when they consider
the role of an unelected judiciary in invalidating democratic
legislation.39 Americans who participate in recall efforts for state or
local officials are aware of a collective right to withdraw consent for
governance from a previously elected official.40 In the context of local
government, local communities are intuitively outraged by state
action, such as annexation or extraterritorial regulation, that
changes the form, structure, or balance of government without
consent of those living in these communities.41 The fact that local
powerlessness cuts against such a fundamental premise of Ameri-
can government is reason to doubt that the black letter law has
accurately captured the role of cities in our constitutional order.
Second, Americans’ ability to participate directly in our democ-
racy is a point of patriotism and civic pride. This participatory style
of democracy earned the admiration of Alexis Tocqueville in his
seminal Democracy in America, in which the French national laud-
ed New England townships for fostering civic involvement, politi-
cal education, communal responsibility, independence, self-esteem,
and political awareness in their citizens.42 The widespread imple-
mentation of open meetings laws that allow the public to observe
and participate in local government assemblies reflects the ongoing
relevance of participatory democracy to our political system.43
38. Grant Dorfman, The Founders' Legal Case: “No Taxation Without Representation”
Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378-80 (2008).
39. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986)
(advocating for judicial restraint in invalidating the actions of elected branches).
40. See Timothy Zick, The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Senators, 103
DICK. L. REV. 567, 600-607 (1999).
41. But cf. Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247,
247-48, 260-62 (1992) (explaining that almost all states require the consent of voters for
annexation although there is no federal constitutional requirement that they do so).
42. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 52-66 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.
Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2012) (1835).
43. See Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes
Making Public Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.L.R.3d § 4 (1971).
10
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Americans’ enthusiasm for direct democracy further shows that we
continue to value direct participation in the lawmaking process.44
Third, our federalist system is legitimated by the premise that
local problems are solved most precisely and justly by local solu-
tions.45 Local solutions can take into account the local community’s
preferences and values, accommodate unique geographic and
economic concerns, experiment with innovative solutions to
widespread problems, and allow jurisdictions to compete for
Tieboutian “foot vot[ers].”46 If a commitment to these advantages of
decentralization induces us to protect state autonomy from the
federal government, it should also induce us to protect local
autonomy from the state government so that the state and the
nation as a whole can enjoy both inter- and intra-state federalism
benefits.47
The persistence of creature of the state doctrine, despite its
evident tension with democratic intuitions about consent of the
governed, direct democracy, and decentralization, can be explained
partly by early assumptions that local governments were prone to
corruption. John Stuart Mill argued in 1861 that local governments
tend toward pettiness and parochialism.48 Indeed, modern local
governments also struggle against capture and self-dealing.49 Even
44. See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAWMAKING 6-9 (2d ed.
2014) (discussing the adoption and modern-day use of initiatives).
45. The Founders’ arguments for a centralized federal government were premised on the
assumption that small state governments would retain control over local concerns. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite .... The powers reserved to the several States
will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the State.”).
46. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
417-18 (1956). I borrow this term from David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy,
95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 802 (2017). 
47. Professor Schleicher’s concern is with the interstate federalism benefits of which we
are deprived when state and local elections become second order to national elections and
national political parties. Schleichler, supra note 46, at 769.
48. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 113-14
(Longmans, Green, & Co. 1919) (1861); see also Roger B. Porter, John Stuart Mill and
Federalism, 7 PUBLIUS 101, 114-16 (1977).
49. Richard Fausset, Monica Davey & Tim Arango, ‘It’s the Human Way’: Corruption
Scandals Play Out in Big Cities Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/02/05/us/fbi-corruption-investigations.html [https://perma.cc/X877-R6UZ]
11
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the fiercest localists may be grateful for state plenary power to
control local governments when we see how the latter may become
hotbeds of elitism,50 prejudice,51 selfishness,52 and parochialism.53
However, I will argue in Part II that the state legislature’s broad
power over local governments is simply not consistent with the
Framers’ assumptions about the nature of popular sovereignty.
B. Plenary Legislative Power as a Limit on State Courts’
Interpretive Function
The doctrine of plenary state power has also influenced how
courts interpret and enforce state constitutional provisions that
limit the legislature. Because the legislature has plenary power,
courts have been extraordinarily deferential to legislatures, on the
theory that to second-guess the legislature is to aggrandize the
judiciary beyond its intended role. This section highlights how
courts have persistently underenforced state constitutional
provisions, including those that impose procedural requirements on
lawmakers, that require all public money to be spent for a public
purpose, and that create a local right to home rule.54
(discussing corruption scandals in Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia).
50. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 493-94, 498 (N.H. 1991) (invalidating local
zoning scheme that effectively barred low- and moderate-income people from moving to the
Town of Chester).
51. Stout v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988, 1014-17 (11th Cir. 2018)
(invalidating city school board’s racially motivated attempt to secede from countywide
education plan).
52. W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 562-565 (Tex. 2003) (noting
that wealthy school districts brought litigation objecting to Texas’s efforts to ameliorate gross
inequalities between the richest and the poorest school districts).
53. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 475-76, 489-90
(Cal. 1976) (holding city ordinance was not facially invalid that placed a freeze on residential
development until local educational, sewage, and water standards were met and effectively
barred new residents from joining the community).
54. Other scholars have criticized state courts for underenforcing substantive provisions
in state constitutions. See, e.g., Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV.
341 (2018) (critiquing underenforcement of state constitutional clauses that require state
compensation for state damage to private property); Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The
Full Realization of Our Rights: The Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 997 (2010) (urging state courts to more vigorously enforce state constitutional rights
to health); Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705 (2012) (arguing
that courts should adopt a “fiduciary” analysis in evaluating state legislatures’ duties under
state constitutional education clauses).
12
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Unlike the federal Constitution, state constitutions typically place
on their legislatures procedural requirements designed to promote
transparency, deliberation, and accountability.55 Such requirements
were amended into state constitutions in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, in response to the Jacksonian concern that
legislatures were operating in secrecy, corruption, carelessness, and
confusion.56 These procedural amendments created “a blueprint for
the due process of deliberative, democratically accountable govern-
ment.”57
However, as Robert F. Williams has forcefully argued, legislators
have not always honored these procedural requirements.58 Particu-
larly when legislation is controversial, legislators may take pains to
avoid the sort of transparent, deliberative, accountable lawmaking
that these process requirements are designed to provide.59 Perhaps
this is unsurprising—we may blame human nature for politicians’
desire to escape accountability. What is more surprising is that
state courts have often let them get away with it.60
Courts have been wary of intruding into the internal affairs of a
coequal branch of government,61 and legislative competence is pre-
sumed.62 Courts defend their unwillingness to enforce the Constitu-
tion under the political question doctrine, sometimes refusing even
to consider whether the legislature has complied with constitutional
55. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 63-64.
56. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 99-100, 118-19, 100-01 nn.20-21
(1998).
57. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 253 (1976).
58. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 824 (1987).
59. See, e.g., Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 77-81, 93-94 (Ky.
2018). In Bevin, the legislature flouted procedural rules to push through highly controversial
pension reform legislation within the last days of the legislative session. Id.
60. Note, though, that some courts have followed Williams’s argument that “[w]hen
fundamental elements of this constitutionally mandated process are ignored and not remedied
by the legislative or executive branches, the courts should step in and examine reliable
evidence of violations.” Williams, supra note 58, at 826-27; see also City of Philadelphia v.
Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 586 (Pa. 2003) (upholding procedural requirements on the
legislature because they had been ratified “with the electorate’s overall goal of curtailing
legislative practices that it viewed with suspicion”).
61. Linde, supra note 57, at 243-45.
62. NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 15:6 (8th ed. 2018) (“The extrinsic evidence rule accords to the enrolled bill
a prima facie presumption of validity.”).
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procedural requirements.63 Some judges and scholars also worry
that such procedural requirements are no longer necessary now that
the spoils system of governance is long behind us, and that these
procedural requirements hamper the legislative process and impede
legislative productivity.64 The result is that constitutional proce-
dural burdens on state legislatures lose some of the force of law and
are less likely to be obeyed.65
The doctrine of plenary legislative power has made a casualty of
the public purpose amendments that were widely ratified by states
in the nineteenth century.66 Public purpose amendments require
states to appropriate funds or take on debt only for public
purposes.67 Public purpose clauses, which are contained in all but
four state constitutions, arose in response to wasteful and specula-
tive giveaways to corporations that led to state defaults and fiscal
distress.68 They were widely implemented to keep legislatures from
giving taxpayer monies away to favored private entities in an effort
to attract economic development.69
State courts with fresh memories of state fiscal distress originally
enforced public purpose requirements rigorously.70 Even in states
that had not amended the public purpose requirement into their
constitutions, state courts were sympathetic to public purpose
63. See Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So. 2d 402, 404-07 (Miss. 2001) (refusing to enforce a
provision of the Mississippi Constitution requiring a full reading of any law before passage).
64. Professor Frank Grad was an early proponent of this view. Frank P. Grad, The State
Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 964-66 (1968). Courts
have also expressed an unwillingness to enforce onerous burdens on legislators. See, e.g.,
Bevin, 563 S.W.3d at 90 (refusing to interpret a constitutional requirement that a 291-page
bill be “read at length” to mean that such bill must be read in its entirety because “[s]uch a
literal interpretation of the words produces an unreasonable and absurd result” that the
Kentucky Constitution’s framers would not have intended). 
65. But see Williams, supra note 58, at 827.
66. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911 (2003).
67. Id. at 910-11.
68. Id. at 910-12; Ralph L. Finlayson, State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Use of
Public Financial Resources in Aid of Private Enterprises, 1 EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONST.
L. 177, 182 (1988).
69. Briffault, supra note 66, at 911-12; David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations
on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265,
279-81 (1963).
70. See, e.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 169 (1853) (”[A] law
authorizing taxation for any other than public purposes is void.”).
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arguments.71 Enforcement remained strong until the 1930s, when
the Great Depression put more pressure on state governments to
compete for private capital.72
However, modern courts tend to defer to the legislature both on
the meaning of public purpose and on determinations of what will
achieve the desired public purpose.73 Like the judicial refusal to
enforce state legislative procedure requirements, courts frame this
deference in terms of judicial humility and democratic values; the
Arizona Supreme Court remarked that “the primary determination
of whether a specific purpose constitutes a ‘public purpose’ is
assigned to the political branches of government, which are directly
accountable to the public.”74 Such language invokes majoritarian
principles, but its tacit message is that legislatures, not courts, are
the legitimate interpreters of state constitutions. The effect of this
deference is to neutralize voters’ power to limit the legitimate
objects of state spending, even through the rigorous process of
constitutional amendment. Viewed in this way, judicial deference to
state legislatures is not majoritarian at all.
Additionally, some modern courts underenforce home rule
provisions in state constitutions.75 Home rule provisions began to
appear in state constitutions in the nineteenth century and were
associated with the Progressive movement’s push to curb legislative
corruption, inefficiency, and excessive state interference in munici-
pal affairs.76 These constitutional clauses overturned Dillon’s Rule
and secured to local communities control over the matters that
affected them most intimately.77 Home rule doctrines vary im-
mensely from state to state and from locality to locality (many
states provide home rule authority only for certain municipalities).78
Home rule provisions may arise pursuant to statute or to
constitutional amendment; they may provide only for lawmaking
71. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 678.
72. Briffault, supra note 66, at 912.
73. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 428, 440 (Wis. 1996)
(deferring to the state legislature on whether an act providing for construction and
maintenance of professional baseball parks served a public purpose).
74. Turken v. Gordon, 224 P.3d 158, 165 (Ariz. 2010).
75. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
76. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 11, at 10-11.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 13-17.
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that is consistent with state law, or they may provide some immu-
nity from state laws in matters of local concern.79 As of a 2016
survey, forty-four states provide for some form of home rule, and
thirty-two of those states have home rule provisions enshrined in
their constitutions.80
However, state legislatures have often been successful at
reabsorbing the power that home rule amendments delegate to
municipalities. Even communities that have a state constitutional
right to home rule may find their laws overturned when the state
legislature preempts local government action it disfavors.81 Courts
have also granted legislatures wide latitude in interpreting home
rule provisions in state constitutions,82 at times proving exceedingly
deferential to legislatures regarding whether local government
legislation is properly “local.”83
The willingness of some courts to defer to legislative judgment
and underenforce home rule provisions is particularly concerning
because a constitutional amendment, while less onerous at the state
79. Id. at 4, 13-17.
80. Jon D. Russell & Aaron Bostrom, Federalism, Dillon Rule and Home Rule, WHITE
PAPER (Am. City Cnty. Exch., Arlington, Va.), Jan. 2016, at 6-7. 
81. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1999-2008 (2018) for an excellent review of aggressive (“punitive” and “nuclear”) state
preemption of local laws on politically controversial subjects such as cooperation with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, gun regulations, minimum-wage laws, and
environmental regulations. For an in-depth look at state preemption of local environmental
laws, see Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 49 TEX. L. REV. 11163, 1169,
1173-74 (2018).
82. See Frug, supra note 8, at 1059-60, 1117 (arguing that cities, even those with home
rule, stand essentially powerless before state legislatures). But see Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990)
(“The insistence on local legal powerlessness reflects a lack of understanding of the scope of
local legal authority. Most local governments in this country are far from legally powerless.
Many enjoy considerable autonomy over matters of local concern. State legislatures, often
criticized for excessive interference in local matters, have frequently conferred significant
political, economic and regulatory authority on many localities. State courts, usually
characterized as hostile to localities and condemned for failing to vindicate local rights against
the states, have repeatedly embraced the concept of strong local government and have
affirmed local regulatory power and local control of basic services. Localism as a value is
deeply embedded in the American legal and political culture.”).
83. See, e.g., City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1206-08, 1211 (Or.
1978) (holding that a constitutional provision granting local governments immunity from
preemptive state legislation applied only to matters of local government form and structure
and did not apply to issues of substantive law in which the legislature had determined that
an issue was one of statewide concern).
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level than at the federal level, is still typically subjected to height-
ened requirements such as legislative approval by a supermajority
and ratification by the voters of the state.84 Home rule require-
ments, like state legislative procedure requirements and the public
purpose doctrine, entered into the law as a result of reform move-
ments.85
Constitutional amendments that imposed procedural, public
purpose, and home rule burdens on state legislatures’ plenary pow-
er were successful because they sought to cure real ills and protect
citizens from legislative misconduct and intrusion. They were
popular enough with the democratic public to survive rigorous
constitutional amendment procedures across many U.S. states.
Their underenforcement, and in particular their underenforcement
on majoritarian grounds, undercuts the most democratic tool
Americans possess: constitutional amendment.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN TENSION WITH THE DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE PLENARY POWER
“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty,” Justice Kennedy
famously remarked in his concurrence with the majority opinion in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.86 But this is a charge against
which the Framers were eager to defend. Far from splitting
sovereignty, the Framers located total sovereignty in the people and
recognized the power of the people to delegate power among
governments.87
This Part reviews theories of popular sovereignty that signifi-
cantly influenced the great compromise of American federalism.
Based on evidence that the Founders conceived of sovereignty as
resting originally and irrevocably with the democratic public, it
concludes that federalism contains inherit limits on the power of
state legislatures, either because the people did not delegate all
84. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 60.
85. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
86. 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. C. E. MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 85
(Batoche Books 2001) (1900) (“The acceptance of this idea was enormously facilitated by
reason of the prevalence of the theory that the Government was at best but an agent or
delegate of another power, the real source of authority, the ‘people.’”). 
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lawmaking power to their state legislatures or because the people
retained the power to revoke state legislative power through
constitutional amendment.
A. Popular Sovereignty as Indivisible Authority
Dominant Western political theory has recognized sovereignty
as absolute and indivisible since the sixteenth century.88 John
Locke’s great innovation in the eighteenth century was locating
ultimate sovereignty in the people, for whom the government is a
mere “fiduciary.”89 Under this framework, the state is not itself
sovereign, but is rather an agent of the sovereign people in whom
the people have placed their trust. Locke “split the atom” of
sovereignty by locating it not in a single government, but in a
plurality that is at the same time single: the community and the
people.
Locke’s innovation was eagerly adopted by American revolution-
ists, who argued that the people, as the ultimate sovereign, had the
right to overthrow a government that had betrayed its trust. James
Otis declared: “[S]upreme absolute power is originally and ulti-
mately in the people; and they never did in fact freely, nor can they
rightfully make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this divine
right.”90 The Declaration of Independence famously located all
lawful authority in the people and asserted that any temporal
government is dependent on the consent of the people for legal
legitimacy.91
Early American state declarations and constitutions also
explicitly placed legal authority with the people. John Adams wrote
in the Massachusetts Proclamation of January 23, 1776:
88. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 1 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992) (1576) (“Sovereignty is the absolute
and perpetual power of a commonwealth.”). For a good brief overview of the evolution of
sovereignty definitions, see Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229,
239-41 (2005).
89. JOHN LOCKE, Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 196, § 149 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947) (1690).
90. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 12 (3d ed.,
Bos. 1766).
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.”).
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It is a maxim, that in every government there must exist
somewhere a supreme, sovereign, absolute, and uncontrollable
power; but this power resides always in the body of the people;
and it never was, or can be, delegated to one man or a few; the
great creator having never given to men a right to vest others
with authority over them unlimited either in duration or
degree.92
In the Virginia Declaration of Rights, from which James Madison
drew heavily in drafting the Bill of Rights, George Mason wrote that
all power was derived from the people, to whom government is a
mere servant.93 Other states employed similar language, and “[t]he
political theory of the time was permeated through and through
with the idea of popular sovereignty, and of the essentially fiduciary
character of all Government.”94
Locating all sovereignty in the people proved to be an important
theoretical move during the ratification debates. As Justice Souter
noted in his Seminole Tribe dissent, “[t]he American development
of divided sovereign powers, which shattered the categories of
government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries,
was made possible only by a recognition that the ultimate sover-
eignty rests in the people themselves.”95 In fact, Antifederalists
argued that the Framers’ proposal of a divided government was a
disingenuous attempt to secure federal control, since the concept of
divided sovereignty was logically impossible.96 James Madison
responded to these critics with The Federalist No. 46, emphasizing
92. John Adams, By the Great and General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay: A
Proclamation (Jan. 23, 1776), reprinted in 1 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 193 (Bos., Little, Brown and Co. 1856).
93. GEORGE MASON, VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 2 (1776) (“That all power is
vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and
servants, and at all times amenable to them.”).
94. MERRIAM, JR., supra note 87, at 168-69 n.472.
95. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 151 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
96. See, e.g., Thomas Tredwell, Speech at the New York Constitutional Ratification
Debate (June 17, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 403 (Jonathan Elliot ed., n.p. 1827) (“The idea of two distinct
sovereigns in the same country, separately possessed of sovereign and supreme power, in the
same matters at the same time, is as supreme an absurdity, as that two distinct separate
circles can be bounded exactly by the same circumference.”).
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that “[t]he federal and State governments are in fact but different
agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers,
and designed for different purposes.”97
Although eventual ratification did not settle the theoretical
niceties of sovereignty,98 the idea that all legitimate authority comes
from the people became a central shared assumption of our
democracy. In Marbury v. Madison, Justice John Marshall defended
the right of the judiciary to judge the actions of a coequal branch of
government by citing the higher authority: the people, from whom
comes the “original and supreme will” that “organizes the govern-
ment, and assigns, to different departments, their respective
powers.”99 This premise continues to enjoy relevance in modern
federalism cases.100
B. Two Challenges to Plenary Power of State Legislatures
Dominant conceptions of sovereignty at the Founding clarify that
citizens of American states have at least two possible theories for
reasserting their power over the state legislatures that are currently
under-circumscribed by state and federal courts. First, the role of
the people in delegating legislative power calls into serious question
whether Hunter and the state legislative plenary power doctrine are
correct as a matter of law. Second, the inherently revocable nature
of delegations of power and the immutable sovereignty of the people
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James
Madison) (“[W]e may define a republic to be ... a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (People are “that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority”); James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6, 1787),
in AMERICAN HISTORY THROUGH ITS GREATEST SPEECHES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 182, 184-85 (J.P. Gerard et al. eds., 2016) (defending the federalist conception
of sovereignty).
98. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 949, 985-87 (1993) (arguing that sovereignty was a “confusing,” “contested,” and
“ambiguous” term at the Founding).
99. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
100. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“In the system established by the Federal Constitution, however, ‘ultimate
sovereignty’ resides in the governed.” (first citing Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 819-20 (2015); and then citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. 304, 324-325 (1816))). 
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suggest that Americans have the potential to revoke some or even
all of the power that they have delegated to state legislatures.
Although state plenary power is the rule under Hunter,101 this
view was by no means universally accepted in early American
history. The people, in ratifying the Constitution, delegated to the
federal government certain enumerated and implied powers, later
reserving to themselves and to the States “[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States.”102 Were all of the powers not delegated
to the federal government delegated to the state government, as
Chief Justice Redfield asserted in Thorpe?103 Or was the crystalliza-
tion of a state legislative plenary power doctrine influenced more by
British models of parliament than by the actual compact among
U.S. citizens, their federal government, and their states? Early
American jurists may not have seriously considered the right to
local self-governance because the original state legislatures were
smaller and more local than those of today. These jurists may have
found that States’ rights under federalism adequately protected the
democratic values of local control, participatory democracy, and
federalism benefits.
Certain evidence suggests that the question of how much power
the people had delegated to their states remained up for grabs
during the eighteenth century, at least in theory. For example,
Justice James Wilson, in Chisolm v. Georgia, may have “hinted that
in his own private view, citizens of the States had not conferred
sovereignty in the sense of absolute authority upon their state
governments, because they had retained some rights to
themselves.”104 Justice Goldberg continued that tradition in his
101. See text accompanying supra note 18.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
103. See Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 142 (1854).
104. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 783 n.23 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Wilson wrote in his concurrence in Chisolm v. Georgia:
[A]ccording to some writers, every State, which governs itself without any
dependence on another power, is a sovereign State. Whether, with regard to her
own citizens, this is the case of the State of Georgia; whether those citizens have
done, as the individuals of England are said, by their late instructors, to have
done, surrendered the Supreme Power to the State or Government, and reserved
nothing to themselves; or whether, like the people of other States, and of the
United States, the citizens of Georgia have reserved the Supreme Power in their
own hands; and on that Supreme Power have made the State dependent, instead
of being sovereign; these are questions, to which, as a Judge in this cause, I can
21
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concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which he held up
the Ninth Amendment as a refutation of plenary state legislative
power.105
If we accept that the people have reserved certain powers neither
enumerated nor necessarily implied in state constitutions, a space
opens up for a constitutional right to local self-government. A
potential doctrine of limited delegated power to state legislatures
deserves to be further explored in modern scholarship and jurispru-
dence. Even if such a view cannot become law because of Hunter and
a century of subsequent precedent, its exploration may illuminate
the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty and cause state
and federal courts to be more aware of the peoples’ intent in
delegating legislative power to state assemblies.
The second challenge to plenary state legislative power is more
practical, because it does not challenge black letter law. It is simply
an encouragement to the people of the various states to exercise a
power that they possess under state and federal law: the power of
amendment. Modern state constitutions, like the state declarations
of the Founding Era, locate all authority in the people and recognize
the authority of the people to alter and even abolish state constitu-
tions.106
Even assuming that Justice Redfield’s view of the delegation to
state legislatures as “total” is correct, people still retain rights
enumerated in their state constitutions, including the right to
rescind from the states by state constitutional amendment any
power that they have given. If the people conclude that the states
have failed in their role as fiduciary of the people’s sovereign
authority, they may alter or abolish the power of state legislatures.
And indeed, they have done so—through constitutional amendments
imposing procedural duties, public purpose requirements, and home
rule doctrines, as well as through constitutional amendments
neither know nor suggest the proper answers; though, as a citizen of the Union,
I know, and am interested to know, that the most satisfactory answers can be
given.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
105. 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
106. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State
Constitutions, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10-19) (on file with author)
(cataloging provisions in state constitutions that locate authority in the people).
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prohibiting special districts, special legislation, and other legislative
abuses of power.107 However, the persistent underenforcement of
such amendments, coupled with the willingness of some courts to
treat state legislatures as the proper interpreters of constitutional
language,108 indicates that more drastic measures may be necessary.
As the sovereign, we the people have the power to radically alter
state constitutions so that they grant limited enumerated powers,
rather than general plenary powers, to state legislatures.
A model state constitutional amendment of this sort might read:
“We the people, insofar as we have delegated all legislative power
to the legislature, do hereby rescind that power. The state legisla-
tures have only those powers enumerated in this constitution, and
all those powers not delegated to the legislature remain with the
people of this state.” Such an amendment would be entirely
consistent with the compact we the people have made with our
states. As the only sovereign, we are free to reassert our ultimate
authority over the state government, which is our mere servant.109
In so doing, we would have the opportunity to think with creativity
and meaning about the role we want state governments to play in
our lives and society.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of broad and plenary state legislative power has
limited the people’s democratic power within their states. Here, I
have explored how the doctrine dulled our democratic power by
eliminating a potential right to local self-governance and by
inducing courts to underenforce constitutional limits on state
legislatures. These trends are problematic because they do not
square with our democratic intuitions or with our desire to have a
sense of efficacy, energy, and power in our own ability to influence
the laws of our communities.
However, the history of popular sovereignty’s role in the founding
of our country reveals that this state of affairs was not unavoidable.
Federal courts could have just as easily concluded that the people
107. See supra Part I.B.
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. See supra Part II.A.
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of states delegated some, but not all, legislative powers to the state
assemblies. Nor is it immutable. Citizens of the states retain the
power to alter and abolish their state legislatures’ powers, or to
direct their courts to show less deference to legislative interpreta-
tions of state constitutions. Scholars, courts, and the public would
do well to give the nature of popular sovereignty renewed attention
so that the people can actively and independently define the nature
of their state and local governments.
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